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NOTES
HELLER v. DOE: FREEDOM FROM BODILY
RESTRAINT AND ASSOCIATED STIGMA-A
FUNDAMENTAL INTEREST
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides, in part, that "[n]o State shall... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' This mandate is inter-
preted to apply to any abridgment of political or civil rights.2 While a
state may, in the creation and application of its laws, classify persons for
differential treatment, the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit the
classification to be based upon impermissible criteria or to be used arbi-
trarily to burden a class of individuals.
3
The standards of review for determining whether criteria are impermis-
sible or whether a classification is arbitrarily burdensome can depend on
the nature of the interest affected.' Where the classification affects an
interest deemed fundamental, it is subject to the strictest scrutiny.' To be
upheld, not only must the state's objective be so compelling that it justi-
fies the limitation the classification places on the individual's interest, but
the classification itself must be absolutely necessary in order for the state
to achieve its objective.' Interests considered fundamental include vot-
ing,7 marriage,8 procreation,' and freedom from bodily restraint and asso-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. RALPH C. CHANDLER ET AL., CONsTrrUTiONAL LAW DESK BOOK: INDIVDuAL
RIGHTS § 7.3, at 490 (2d ed. 1993).
3. Id. at 497.
4. Id.; see also infra notes 50-69 and accompanying text (discussing the determination
of standards of review).
5. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 18.3, at 15 (2d ed. 1992).
6. Id
7. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) ("The right of suffrage is a fun-
damental matter in a free and democratic society.... [It] is preservative of other basic...
political rights."). Citizens have the right to "participate in elections on an equal basis with
other citizens in the jurisdiction." Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972). However,
that right is not absolute and government may impose voter qualifications as well as regu-
late access to franchises, as long as the purpose is compelling and the limitation is neces-
sary. Id.
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ciated stigma. 10
Since ancient times, persons with mental retardation" have been sub-
ject to differential treatment. 12 Commonly labeled as fools, imbeciles,
and idiots, the mentally retarded have been perceived to be demons and
treated as "buffoons and court jesters."'" In the United States, the Four-
teenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee has not provided equal-
ity for the mentally retarded. During the Eugenics Movement' 4 of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the mentally retarded were
believed to be "a menace to civilization,... burdens to the school,...
breeders of feebleminded offspring, [and] victims and spreaders of pov-
erty, degeneracy, crime, and disease.' 5 States enacted laws to segregate
8. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942) ("Marriage ... [is] fundamental
to the very existence and survival of the race."); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
386 (1978) (reaffirming the "fundamental character of the right to marry").
9. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) ("If the right to privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child.").
10. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980); see also discussion infra part IV.
11. The current definition of mental retardation, formulated by the American Associa-
tion on Mental Retardation, refers to:
substantial limitations in present functioning ... characterized by significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations
in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication,
self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and
safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests
before age 18.
Brief of the American Association on Mental Retardation, The ARC, The ARC of Ken-
tucky, The Association for Persons with Severe Handicaps (TASH), TASH of Kentucky,
the American Association of University Affiliated Programs for the Developmentally Dis-
abled, The American Orthopsychiatric Association, The Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Founda-
tion, and The American Civil Liberties Foundation as Amid Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 9 n.6, Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) (No. 92-351) [hereinafter Br. of
Am. Ass'n on Mental Retardation].
12. MARY BEIRNE-SMrTH ET AL, MENTAL RETARDATION 28 (4th ed. 1994).
13. Id. Historical names for the mentally retarded also include moron, feebleminded,
mental defect, and retardate. Id.
14. Eugenics is defined as "a science that deals with the improvement (as by control of
human mating) of hereditary qualities of a race or breed." WEBSTER'S NEw COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 390 (1981).
15. BEIRNE-SMrrH ET AL., supra note 12, at 34 (quoting L.A. KANNER, A HISTORY OF
THE CARE AND STUDY OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 85 (1964)). This was a change in
attitude from an earlier period of humanism (Le., a concern with people's worth as human
beings and with their freedom to develop) and is thought to be the result of the "national
disharmony" during the period ranging from 1860 to 1890 as well'as the dramatic change
towards urbanization and industrialization. Id. at 33. The idea that the mentally retarded
could attain "normalcy" was wholly disregarded. Id.
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the mentally retarded by institutionalizing them for "at least the repro-
ductive years" to purify society "by cutting off its supply of defectives.' 16
The mentally retarded were even subject to sterilization. 7 In the 1927
Supreme Court decision, Buck v. Bell,"8 the Court upheld a sterilization
statute of the Commonwealth of Virginia.19 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Holmes stated, "[lt is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from con-
tinuing their kin..... Three generations of imbeciles is enough."20
Since the 1970s, a more tolerant and protective attitude toward the
mentally retarded has emerged. Through litigation and legislation, the
mentally retarded have secured the right to education2 ' and habilitative
treatment.12 For example, in Penry v. Lynaugh,23 the Supreme Court
16. Id. at 35 (quoting KANNER, supra note 15, at 136).
17. Id at 37. Indiana enacted the first sterilization law in 1907. BEiRNE-SMrrH ET AL,
supra note 12, at 37. By 1927, 23 states had enacted similar laws. Id. From 1900 through
the 1960s, over 100,000 institutionalized persons were involuntarily sterilized. Debbie
Goldberg, Sterilization Case Has Become Fight over Rights of Retarded: Mother, Legal
Guardian Divide on Best Interests of Woman, 26, WASH. POSr, Nov. 27, 1994, at A3.
18. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
19. It should be noted that the plaintiff in the case, Carrie Buck, was most likely not
mentally retarded. BEIRNE-SMrrH ET AL., supra note 12, at 37. This case has not been
overruled and the Supreme Court, on November 11, 1994, declined to block the steriliza-
tion of a 26 year old retarded woman with the mental capacity of a five year old. Estate of
C.W., 640 A.2d 445 (Pa. 1991), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1175 (1994). Her mother had sought
sterilization because C.W. lives in an all female group home and is "vulnerable ... because
she does not understand the consequences of her affectionate behavior." Souter Doesn't
Block Sterilization of Retarded Woman, WASH. PosT, Nov. 12, 1994, at A2; Goldberg,
supra note 17.
20. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207 (citation omitted).
21. Lebanks v. Spears, 60 F.R.D. 135 (E.D. La. 1973) (mandating that the state must
strive to make every child self-sufficient or employable and provide educational opportuni-
ties to adults who were not taught as children); Education for All Handicapped Children
Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1988) (assuring all children with disabilities a free public
school education in the least restrictive environment); Americans With Disabilities Act of
1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a)-12213 (West Supp. 1991) (prohibiting discrimination based
on disability). Congress has determined that individuals with disabilities for purposes of
the Americans With Disabilities Act are:
a discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limita-
tions, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a
position of political powerlessness in our society based on characteristics that are
beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereotypical assump-
tions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate
in, and contribute to society.
42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(7) (West Supp. 1991).
22. Habilitation pertains to "behavior change in the direction of those skills that cu-
mulatively allow community [as opposed to institutional] living." BEmINE-SmrT ET AL.,
1995)
242 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 12:239
held that mental retardation should be considered a mitigating factor
when the death penalty is at issue.24 In 1994, Congress passed a law
prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty upon a mentally retarded
person.' Also, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,26 the
Supreme Court found a zoning restriction prohibiting mentally retarded
persons from establishing a group home to be a violation of equal
protection.27
In the area of involuntary civil commitment, however, the mentally re-
tarded are still subject to differential treatment. In June 1993, the
Supreme Court held in Heller v. Doe2A8 that Kentucky statutes providing
disparate procedures for the institutionalization of mentally retarded
adults and mentally ill adults did not violate the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 29 Involuntary commitment undeniably
affects an individual's freedom from bodily restraint and associated
stigma,30 yet the Court refused to apply a strict scrutiny analysis because
supra note 12, at 480 (quoting D. BAER, ThE NATURE OF INTERVENTION REsEARCH 91
(1981)); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982) (holding that individuals
with severe mental retardation involuntarily confined to state facilities have a constitu-
tional right to habilitative services to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint);
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373,379-86 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affd in part and rev'd in part,
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (declaring that the constitutional right of
institution residents had been violated under the Fourteenth Amendment and defining
minimum standards for the state to adopt in areas including the right to treatment and
habilitation, records and review, physical environment, medication, and admission
policies).
23. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
24. Id. at 319. On remand, Penry was found guilty and sentenced to death. BEIPrm-
SMrTH Er AL, supra note 12, at 487, 489.
25. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3596(c) (West Supp. 1995).
A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who is mentally re-
tarded. A sentence of death shall not be carried out upon a person who, as a
result of mental disability, lacks the mental capacity to understand the death pen-
alty and why it is imposed on that person.
Id
26. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
27. Id. at 448. The City required a proposed group home for the mentally retarded to
obtain a special use permit, when other care and multiple dwelling facilities were freely
permitted. Id. at 447. The City then refused to issue the permit and the group filed suit. Id.
at 447-48.
28. 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
29. Id at 2643-48; see also Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202B.160(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1991) (designating the standard of proof to involuntarily commit a mentally retarded per-
son to be clear and convincing evidence). But see Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202A.076(2)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991) (designating the standard of proof to commit a mentally ill
person to be beyond a reasonable doubt).
30. See discussion infra part IV.
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the request for strict scrutiny was not "properly presented.' Instead,
the Court examined the statutes under a rational-basis review, and de-
ferred to Kentucky's justifications for the disparate procedures.3 2 The
Court found the procedures rationally related to the State's objective of
caring for the mentally retarded and protecting the community from dan-
gerous persons.
33
Heller v. Doe was the Supreme Court's first consideration of the consti-
tutional issues surrounding involuntary commitment of mentally retarded
adults.34 The significance of Heller v. Doe is not in the substance of the
majority opinion but, instead, that it was a five-to-four decision3" in which
the Court refused to consider a heightened form of scrutiny because the
request for such scrutiny was not "properly presented. 3 6 Justice Souter,
in his dissent, also declined to address the applicability of a heightened
scrutiny, but only because he found the Kentucky statute irrational under
a rational-basis standard of review.37 Justice Blackmun stated explicitly
in a separate dissent that laws infringing upon fundamental interests, such
as those presented by the Kentucky statutes, are subject to heightened
scrutiny.
3s
In addition to Kentucky, forty-one states currently provide disparate
involuntary commitment procedures for mentally retarded and mentally
ill adults.39 Therefore, this issue may very well come before the Supreme
31. Heller., 113 S. Ct. at 2642; see infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing
the Court's determination that Doe's request was not properly presented).
32. Itt at 2643.
33. 1d.
34. Br. of Am. Ass'n on Mental Retardation, supra note 11, at 8. The Supreme Court
has determined that the due process rights of mentally retarded children are met where a
statute provides for voluntary commitment on the recommendation/application of a parent
or guardian, physician, pediatrician, or psychologist and there is an independent psychiatric
examination and review by a mental health professional whose only concern is whether the
mentally retarded child would benefit from institutionalization. Secretary of Pub. Welfare
of Pa. v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 442 U.S. 640, 649-50 (1979).
35. The decision was five-to-four on the issue of the disparate burdens of proof. Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote for the majority and was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices
White, Scalia and Thomas. The decision was six-to-three on the issue of participation of
guardians and family members. Justice O'Connor joined the majority on this issue. Id. at
2650.
36. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2642.
37. Id. at 2651 (Souter, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 2650 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun also joined in Justice Sou-
ter's dissent. Id.
39. Ia. at 2646-47 n.2. The only states that provide a single commitment statute are
Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Id.
1995]
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Court again on a properly presented request for heightened scrutiny
based on the fundamental nature of the interest at stake.
Part I of this Note sets forth the criteria for a strict scrutiny,' fundamen-
tal interest analysis under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Part II discusses the Majority decision in.Heller v. Doe.
Part III discusses the dissenting opinions in Heller v. Doe. Part IV traces
the development of the view that freedom from bodily restraint and asso-
ciated stigma is among the most fundamental of liberty interests. Part V
of this Note analyzes Heller v. Doe under a strict scrutiny, fundamental
interest review. This Note concludes that where freedom from bodily re-
straint and associated stigma is threatened by the possibility of involun-
tary civil commitment, the equal protection clause commands that the
mentally retarded be given the same protections under the law as the
mentally ill.
I. EQUAL PROTECrION AND FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS
The Fourteenth Amendment mandates that individuals shall not be de-
nied "the equal protection of the laws.",40 Although equal protection can-
not be precisely defined,4 1 courts traditionally have guaranteed that all
individuals be treated fairly in the exercise of their fundamental rights
and have disallowed distinctions in treatment based on impermissible
criteria.
42
As part of the Fourteenth Amendment, the equal protection clause was
ratified in 1868 to guarantee equality to the newly freed slaves in the
exercise of their political and civil liberties.43 Prior to World War I, its
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This clause is imputed to the federal government
through the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954).
41. CHANDLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 490.
42. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 5, at 5; see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374, 387 (1978) (holding that a statute requiring court approval to marry if under a child
support obligation by any court order or judgment unnecessarily infringes upon a funda-
mental right to marry and is, therefore, a violation of equal protection); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (holding that a statute prohibiting single persons from
obtaining contraceptives to prevent pregnancy violates equal protection); Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (holding durational residency laws for voting violate equal
protection because there is no compelling state interest behind such an impermissible crite-
ria); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964) (holding vote-diluting discrimination vio-
lates equal protection because it infringes upon a citizen's fundamental right to vote).
43. CHANDLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 490. In fact, the Court tried to limit use of the
clause to situations where state laws "discriminated with gross injustice and hardship"
against "newly emancipated negroes." Id. at 495 (quoting the Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. 36 (1873)).
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use was generally limited to cases involving economic rights." Today, the
equal protection clause is more expansively interpreted to include any
abridgment of political and civil rights.45
In the creation and application of its laws, a state may classify persons
for differential treatment. 6 Any such classification, however, "must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground or difference
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike."'4 7 The fo-
cus of the analysis is whether the affected class is, in fact, dissimilar from
other classes in terms of the promotion of a legitimate governmental
objective.8
When evaluating an equal protection challenge, courts must first deter-
mine the standard of review required to adjudicate the particular contro-
versy.49 The Supreme Court has articulated three levels of scrutiny:
minimal or rational-basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scru-
tiny.50 A rational-basis review is used in areas such as economic regula-
tion and general social welfare, 1 where courts have no "institutional
capability" to assess the scope of legitimacy of the governmental objec-
tive and are, therefore, willing to defer to the legislative judgment.52 In
such a case, courts must uphold a classification against an equal protec-
tion challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification. 53 There is a presump-
44. Id. at 490.
45. Id.
46. 1d at 497.
47. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972).
48. 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 5, at 8; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 43940 (1985); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
49. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). The standard of
review represents the degree of deference the court will afford the legislature. 3 ROTUNDA
& NowAK, supra note 5, at 13.
50. 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 5, at 14-16.
51. aid at 14; see, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568,593 (1979)
(holding a public authority may deny employment to methadone users as a class because
legislative concerns over safety and efficiency are rational); United States v. Carolene
Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 145-46 (1938) (finding public health and the possibility of fraud on
the public were rational concerns behind the Filled Milk Act which prohibited "shipment
in interstate commerce of skimmed milk compounded with any fat or oil other than milk
fat, so as to resemble milk or cream").
52. 3 ROTUNDA & NowAx, supra note 5, at 14.
53. F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2096, 2101 (1993). The Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 required cable television companies to be franchised
by local governments unless it served "only subscribers in [one] or more multiple unit
dwellings under common ownership, control, or management, unless such ... facilities
1995]
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tion of constitutionality in this level of scrutiny, and the state has no obli-
gation to produce evidence to support its objectives.5 4 The state is also
not required to use the least restrictive means to achieve its objectives.55
Courts are not as deferential to the political branches of government
under the intermediate and strict scrutiny standards of review as they are
under the rational-basis standard of review. Intermediate scrutiny is used
in cases involving gender classification. 6 It requires the classification
"serve important governmental objectives and ... be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives.""7
Strict scrutiny is employed when the classification involves either a sus-
pect class 58 or a fundamental interest. 9 Courts will not defer to a legisla-
ture's rationale for such a classification, but will independently determine
whether the governmental objective is so compelling or overriding that it
justifies the limitation on fundamental constitutional values °.6  The deter-
mination as to whether an interest is compelling rather than merely legiti-
mate is usually done by analogy because the Supreme Court has not
provided much guidance.6 1 Even if the state objective is found to be
compelling, the classification still must be absolutely necessary (the least
restrictive means available) to achieve the compelling objective.62
The range of interests considered fundamental, and therefore demand-
ing of strict scrutiny, are not infinite6 3 and must be explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution.64 Specifically, the nature of the interest
(not just the weight of the interest to the individual) must be "within the
us[e] any public right-of-way." Id at 2099 (quoting 47 U.S.C.A. § 522(7)(B) (West Supp.
1993)). Finding two plausible bases for the common-ownership distinction, the Court up-
held the statute. Id. at 2103.
54. Id. at 2101-02.
55. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51 (1973).
56. 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 5, at 17. This level of scrutiny has also been
used in cases involving illegitimacy classification. Id; see also Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S.
495 (1976).
57. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (holding that gender does not represent a
legitimate proxy for the regulation of drinking and driving).
58. 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 5, at 15; see also United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (discussing the important judicial function in pro-
tecting "discrete and insular minorities"). A primary example of a suspect class is race.
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
59. 3 ROTUNDA & NowAx, supra note 5, at 15.
60. Id
61. WILLIAM A. KAPLIN, THE CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF CoNsTrTUTIONAL LAW
142 (1992).
62. CHANDLER ET AL., supra note 2, at 498.
63. Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
64. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
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contemplation of the 'liberty or property' language of the Fourteenth
Amendment., 65 Although the Supreme Court has never defined all the
interests included in the term liberty, "[w]ithout doubt, it denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right... to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pur-
suit of happiness by free men."6 6 The identification of a liberty interest
as fundamental is then a judicial determination as to whether the Consti-
tution explicitly or implicitly evidences the existence of a value so essen-
tial to individual liberty that it should not be controlled by the political
branches of government.67 These are interests which are "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty"68 and "deeply rooted in the Nation's history
and tradition. '69
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN HELLER V. DOE
A. Case History
Heller v. Doe70 was filed in 1982 as a class action by Samuel Doe
against the Secretary of the Cabinet for Human Resources for the State
of Kentucky.71 Doe fied the suit on behalf of all mentally retarded
adults in Kentucky "who [had] been admitted or who face[d] admission
to [a state] intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded. '72 The
suit challenged the State's involuntary civil commitment statute for the
mentally retarded, claiming it did not provide adequate procedural pro-
tections.73 The history of the case is "long and complicated" and Ken-
tucky has revised its civil commitment statute for the mentally retarded
65. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 494 (1972) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67 (1972)).
66. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). Liberty also includes:
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupa-
tions of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of [one's] own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.
Id
67. JoHN E. NowAK ET AL., CONSTrTUTONAL LAW 532 n.21 (3d ed. 1986).
68. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
69. Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,503 (1977); see, e.g., supra notes 7-10
and accompanying text.
70. 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
71. Doe v. Cowherd, 770 F. Supp. 354 (W.D. Ky. 1991), affd in part, rev'd in part, 965
F.2d 109 (6th Cir. 1992), and rev'd sub nom. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993); Brief for
Respondents at 1, Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) (No. 92-351).
72. Brief for Respondents, supra note 71, at 1.
73. Id. at 1-2. In fact, at the time the suit was filed virtually every commitment to a
1995]
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several times since the case was originally brought.74 Each revision has
been challenged by Doe.75
The statute for involuntary commitment of the mentally retarded, as it
stands today, requires a finding that:
(1) The person is a mentally retarded person; (2) The person
presents a danger or a threat of danger to self, family, or others;
(3) The least restrictive alternative mode of treatment presently
available requires placement [in an institution]; and (4) Treat-
ment that can reasonably benefit the person is available in [a
state institution].
76
These propositions must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.77
The guardian and immediate family members of the mentally retarded
person may participate in these proceedings as if a party.71 This partici-
pation includes the right to be represented by separate counsel from that
of the mentally retarded person, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and
standing to appeal any adverse decision.79 By comparison, Kentucky's
involuntary civil commitment statute for the mentally ill provides that:
No person shall be involuntarily hospitalized unless such person
is a mentally ill person: (1) Who presents a danger or threat of
danger to self, family or others as a result of the mental illness;
(2) Who can reasonably benefit from treatment; and (3) For
whom hospitalization is the least restrictive alternative mode of
treatment presently available.80
These propositions must be established by the more rigorous standard of
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt.""1 In contrast to the involuntary
commitment procedures of the mentally retarded, the guardian and im-
mediate family members of the mentally ill person are not permitted to
participate as if a party to the proceedings.82
Doe argued before the Supreme Court that the lower standard of proof
provided for commitment of the mentally retarded and the ability of the
family to participate as if a party violates the equal protection clause of
state institution was characterized as voluntary in order to avoid the existing involuntary
commitment procedures altogether. Id. at 2.
74. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2640.
75. Id
76. Ky. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 202B.040 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
77. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202B.160(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
78. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202B.160(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
79. Id
80. Ky. Rsv. STAT. ANN. §202A.026 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
81. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 202A.076 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
82. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN, § 202A.006-.991 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
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the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 In the lower courts, Doe claimed that
there is no rational basis for the disparate procedures and both the
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed.M Kentucky
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari and its petition was
granted. 5
B. Justice Kennedy's Majority Opinion
The majority of the Court reversed the lower courts. It recognized
that Kentucky has a legitimate objective under its parens patriae6 power
to take care of those who cannot take care of themselves and under its
police power to protect the community from those who are dangerous.8 7
The Court then determined how much deference to afford Kentucky in
the face of this constitutional challenge."8 In his brief to the Supreme
Court, Doe argued that some form of heightened scrutiny should apply. 9
However, because he had requested only a rational-basis review in the
lower courts, and because those courts had decided the case utilizing that
standard, the majority ruled that Doe's request for heightened scrutiny
was "not properly presented."9 The Court determined that even if
heightened scrutiny should apply, it would be "imprudent and unfair to
inject a new standard at this stage in the litigation."91 The majority then
outlined the requirements for a traditional rational-basis review' and
stated that it had previously applied this standard to a situation involving
83. Brief for Respondents, supra note 71, at 8; Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2640
(1993). Doe also argued that the participation of a guardian or family members violates the
due process clause as well. Brief for Respondents, supra note 71, at 9-10.
84. Doe v. Cowherd, 965 F.2d 109, 113 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Heller v. Doe,
113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
85. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 373 (1992).
86. Parens Patriae "refers traditionally to role of state as sovereign and guardian of
persons under disability." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
87. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2649 (1993).
88. Id at 2642; see also supra notes 49-62 and accompanying text (discussing the stan-
dards of review and the deference to legislative judgment required by each).
89. Brief for Respondents, supra note 71, at 23.
90. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2642. Doe had not had an occasion to argue for heightened
scrutiny. Since the latest hearing before the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in
March 1992, the Supreme Court had decided Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 1786,
1788 (1992), which suggested a higher level of scrutiny for challenges to involuntary com-
mitment procedures. In addition, the Americans With Disabilities Act had determined
that individuals with physical and mental disabilities are a "discrete and insular minority."
Brief for Respondents, supra note 71, at 23-24.
91. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2642.
92. Id at 2649-50.
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the mentally retarded in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.
93
1. Rational-Basis Review Applied to Disparate Burdens of Proof
The Heller majority held that the disparate burdens of proof for invol-
untary commitment of the mentally retarded and mentally ill have a ra-
tional-basis. 4 The initial focus of its discussion was on Kentucky's
argument that mental retardation is easier to diagnose than mental ill-
ness95 and that dangerousness is easier to determine in the mentally re-
tarded. 96 The majority accepted Kentucky's assertion that mental
retardation is easier to diagnose because it is a "developmental disability"
that manifests itself before adulthood.97 Mental illness, the State as-
serted, is extremely difficult to diagnose and its onset is often sudden and
may not occur until later in life.98 The majority also accepted the State's
claim that dangerousness was easier to determine in cases involving the
mentally retarded because there is an established history of such
behavior.99
Although the majority recognized that the loss of liberty following the
involuntary commitment of the two classes is similar, it justified the dis-
parate burdens of proof based on the "nature and extent of the depriva-
tion" of liberty.' The State proffered that postcommitment treatment
of the two classes differed and the majority accepted the State's claim
93. 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). But see Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2651-52 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (recognizing that the Cleburne Court looked into the record to determine whether the
state's objectives were rational); Clebume, 473 U.S. at 458 (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). It should be noted that Clebume did not involve fundamental
interests; rather, it involved zoning regulations similar to the general economic and social
welfare type cases in which the court typically defers to the state. See supra notes 51-55
and accompanying text. Therefore, rational basis is not necessarily the standard for all
cases involving the mentally retarded.
94. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2649-50.
95. Id at 2643.
96. Id at 2644.
97. Id at 2643.
98. Id at 2643-44.
99. Id. at 2644. Mental retardation is a "permanent, relatively static condition."
Therefore, prior violent acts may be indicative of future behavior. Id.
. 100. Id at 2645 (emphasis added). The majority states that the standards of proof may
vary depending on the nature and extent of the deprivation. Id In support of its rationale,
the majority compared the beyond a reasonable doubt standard required to convict an
alleged criminal to the lesser standard required to commit a mentally ill person. Id at 2645-
46. As incarceration is punitive, and therefore more oppressive than commitment to an
institution, a higher standard is justified. Id. at 2645. But see id at 2653 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that the determining factor is the value society places on the liberty interest at
stake and this value is the same whether one is mentally ill or mentally retarded).
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without looking into the record."' 1 Additionally, the majority justified its
deference to the State based on the history of differential treatment of
the mentally ill and mentally retarded in Anglo-American law."0 z It also
noted that a large majority of states currently provide disparate commit-
ment procedures for the two classes of individuals. 0 3 Finally, the major-
ity determined that the State, under a rational-basis review, was not
"required to convince the courts of the correctness of [its] legislative
judgments."'"
2. Rational-Basis Review and Guardian/Family Participation
The majority found that Kentucky's statutory provision allowing a
guardian or immediate family member to participate as if a party to the
commitment proceedings of the mentally retarded, but not the proceed-
ings of the mentally ill, was also rational. 05 As mental retardation
manifests itself early in life and results in "'deficits or impairments in
adaptive functioning,"' the majority determined Kentucky "may have
concluded" that guardians or family members have "intimate knowledge"
of the mentally retarded person and can provide "valuable insights" to
the commitment process. 106 By comparison, the majority continued, the
onset of mental illness often occurs later in life so the guardian or family
101. IL at 2645. The majority determined that differing postcommitment treatment jus-
tified disparate commitment procedures. Id It relied on the State's assertion that postcom-
mitment treatment of the mentally ill is more invasive. Id. But see id. at 2655 (treatment of
the mentally retarded includes behavior modification to correct "anxiety disorders, pho-
bias, hyperactivity, and antisocial behavior, therapy that may include aversive conditioning
as well as forces exposure to objects that trigger severe anxiety reactions"); Brooks v. Fla-
herty, 699 F. Supp. 1178, 1187 (W.D. N.C. 1988), affd, 902 F.2d 250 (4th Cir.), and cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 951-52 (1990) (finding abuse of antipsychotic drugs where, of the mentally
retarded who where administered antipsychotic drugs, less than 50% were also mentally
ill); Robert Plotkin & Kay R. Gill, Invisible Manacles: Drugging Mentally Retarded People
31 STAN. L. REv. 637, 650 (1979) (drugs are often used in institutions for the mentally
retarded to reduce the number of staff needed).
102. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2646. The majority discussed the "'marked distinction' in treat-
ment accorded 'idiots' (the mentally retarded) and 'lunatics' (the mentally ill)" at English
common law, finding this suggests a common sense distinction. Id. (quoting 1 F. POLLOCK
& F. MArthAND, THE HIS'TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 481 (2d ed. 1909). But see id. at 2656 n.6
(Souter, J., dissenting) (questioning the majority's suggestion that the "irrational and scien-
tifically unsupported beliefs of the pre-19th-century England can support any distinction in
the treatment between the mentally ill and the mentally retarded today").
103. Id. at 2646. Forty-one states provide disparate commitment procedures for the
mentally retarded and the mentally ill. Id. at 2646 n.2.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2647.
106. Ia
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members would not have the years of experience with such behavior to
offer to the proceedings. 10 7 Additionally, it recognized that mentally ill
adults, previously of sound mind, have a greater need for privacy. 10 8
This, it determined, also justifies prohibiting guardian or family participa-
tion as if a party to the commitment proceedings of the mentally ill.1 9
The majority accepted that the guardian and family members of the men-
tally retarded could be useful in the commitment proceedings without be-
ing a party, but decided it would not require the State to choose the
"least-restrictive means [to] achiev[e] its legislative end." 110
III. THE DIsESr.rrINo OPINIONS IN HELLER 1. DoE
A. Justice Souter's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Souter expressed his disagreement with the majority's finding
that Doe's request for heightened scrutiny was "not 'properly
presented.""" He determined, however, that he did not need to pursue
that issue because, under the rational-basis review applied in Cleburne,
the disparate procedures were irrational and therefore a violation of
equal protection." 2 He noted that the rational-basis review employed in
Cleburne, to which the majority looked for support, was different from
the traditional rational-basis review."' In Cleburne, while purporting to
apply a rational-basis review, the Court actually looked into the record to
determine whether there was adequate support for the State's justifica-
tions for discriminating against the mentally retarded with respect to a
zoning restriction."'
Applying the Cleburne heightened rational-basis review, Justice Souter
found the disparate burdens of proof for commitment of the mentally ill
and the mentally retarded to be irrational."' He opined that the princi-
107. Id. at 2643 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC & STA-
TISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 28-29 (3d rev. ed. 1987)).
108. Ill
109. Id at 2647-48. Again, the majority found the State "may have concluded" that
guardians or family of the mentally ill could not add enough to the proceedings to justify
the "additional burden and complications of granting party status." Id at 2648.
110. Id at 2648 (citation omitted).
111. Id at 2650-51 (quoting id. at 2642).
112. Id. at 2651.
113. Id.; see also supra note 93 (discussing the rational-basis review standard as applied
in Clebume).
114. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2651-52. Justice Souter discusses the heightened rational-basis
review as applicable to classifications on the basis of mental disability. Id.
115. Id at 2653.
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pal object in setting burdens is not merely to reflect the difficulty of diag-
nosis and establishment of dangerous behavioral patterns, as the State
argued, but also to reflect the importance of the subsequent finding to all
parties." 6 This requires a balancing of the interest of the community in
being protected from potential danger and the interest of the individual
in being cared for with the value society places on the individual's liberty
interest." 7 This liberty interest is the freedom from bodily restraint and
from the stigma that such restraint imposes on an institutionalized per-
son. 18 The classification of the individual as mentally retarded or men-
tally ill bears no relation to these interests." 9 Justice Souter determined
that the mentally retarded and the mentally ill, as subjects for involuntary
commitment, may both need to be cared for and may both be danger-
ous. 120 Therefore, he claimed, the State's objectives are of "equal
strength in each category of cases.' 121 Accordingly, he could find no jus-
tification for placing a lower value on this liberty interest for the mentally
retarded.'2
Justice Souter determined that the "intimate knowledge" and "valua-
ble insight" of the guardian and immediate family members of the men-
tally retarded may justify their participation as witnesses, but not as
parties to the commitment proceedings.' 2 He could not justify a greater
role. 24 Justice Souter found the participation of the guardian or family
member as parties, more often than not, imposes not only a "second ad-
vocate for institutionalization" on the mentally retarded person, but also




119. Id. at 2653-54; cf. supra notes 101-03 (The majority determined that the classifica-
tion was relevant due to (1) differences in postcommitment treatment, (2) prior differences
in treatment in Anglo-American law, and (3) the fact that the majority of states currently
provide disparate procedures for the two classes).
120. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2653.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 2656.
124. Id. at 2656-57.
125. Id at 2657; see also Brief for Respondents, supra note 71, at 43 (the interests of
parents of mentally retarded adults have often proven to be adverse to those of their child,
"resisting placement in less restrictive settings deemed by mental retardation professionals
to be more appropriate, either because of overprotectiveness, ignorance of [the child's]
capabilities, [or] ignorance of the ... community to provide appropriate services"); Mark
Tausig, Factors in Family Decision-Making About Placement For Developmentally Disabled
Individuals, 89 AM. J. MENTAL DEICIENcy 352, 358 (1985) ("[s]tressors within the family
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it the right to call and cross-examine witnesses, obtain experts, and appeal
a decision not to institutionalize the mentally retarded person. 26 Justice
Souter could find no rational justification for placing this additional bur-
den on the mentally retarded. 27
B. Justice Blackmun's Dissent
In a very brief dissent, Justice Blackmun stated his view that "laws that
discriminate against individuals with mental retardation or infringe upon
fundamental rights are subject to heightened review."' This reiterated
his position in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 29 and Foucha
v. Louisiana.' He also joined Justice Souter's dissenting opinion.
131
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM BODILY
RESTRAINT AND ASSOCIATED STIGMA
A. Freedom From Bodily Restraint
The Thirty-Ninth Article of England's Magna Carta, signed on June 15,
1215, declared that "[n]o freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned,... or
outlawed, or banished, or any ways destroyed ... unless by the legal judg-
ment of his peers, or by the law of the land.' l3 While the Magna Carta
was the first written acknowledgment of these rights by a sovereign, these
were rights that free Englishmen had long possessed.133 "[C]onfirmed no
less than thirty-two times by subsequent [English] monarchs[,]" these
rights came to be considered birth rights.'" 4
The Magna Carta was a plain statement of the most elementary rights
to liberty which, in the "limited sense[,] signify freedom of the person or
[including) the burden of care, and disruption of family relations contribute [ ] significantly
to the placement request process.... [T]he impact of the older disabled family member on
the . .. family must be seen as central to the decision-making process").
126. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2657.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2650 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
129. 473 U.S. 432, 455-78 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part,
joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ.).
130. 504 U.S. 71, 73-86 (1992) (White, J., plurality).
131. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2650 (Souter, J., dissenting).
132. Charles E. Shattuck, The True Meaning of the Term "Liberty" In Those Clauses in
the Federal and State Constitutions Which Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property.", 4 HARv.
L. Rnv. 365, 372 (1890). King John of England was compelled by English barons, under
"point of sword," to sign the Magna Carta. Id. at 370.
133. Id. at 373. These were rights that had "theoretically always [been] possessed under
the common law." Id.
134. Id. at 370.
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body."' 35 This concept of liberty is found in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence1 36 and in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti-
tution.137 Although the term "liberty" has not been defined with
exactness in the United States, the Supreme Court, in Meyers v. Ne-
braska,38 stated that "[w]ithout doubt, it denotes not merely freedom
from bodily restraint."'139 Through prior and subsequent case law, the
Supreme Court has determined that freedom from bodily restraint is es-
sential to the liberty of the Declaration of Independence and the Consti-
tution, both in the civil and criminal contextts.
140
B. Associated Stigma
In the criminal context, the Supreme Court has long considered free-
dom from bodily restraint accompanied by the loss of a "good name" a
vital consideration in the determination of criminal guilt.141 Webster's
Dictionary defines the word "stigma" as "a mark of shame or dis-
credit."' 42 More recently, in the civil context, the Court has determined
that the stigmatizing consequences of institutionalization, coupled with
physical confinement, is a "grievous loss.'
43
C. The Fundamental Interest and the Charged Criminal
1. Freedom From Bodily Restraint
Freedom from bodily restraint, as applied to one facing criminal incar-
ceration, has long been recognized as a fundamental liberty interest. A
comment on the English Habeas Corpus Act, published in Boston in
1721, stated: "There are three things which the law of England ... princi-
pally regards and taketh care of, viz., life, liberty, and estate. Next to a
man's life the nearest thing that concerns him is freedom of his person;
135. Id. at 373. Freedom of the person was a mandatory provision in all confirmations
of the 39th Article and from thereon was always found alongside rights of life and prop-
erty. Id. at 376.
136. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (stating that "all men
are created equal ... with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness").
137. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (stating "[n]o state shall deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law"); U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that "[no]
person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
138. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
139. Id. at 399.
140. See discussion infra parts IV.C-E.
141. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
142. WEBSMR'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1134 (1981).
143. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980).
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for indeed, what is imprisonment but a kind of civil death?"'" The high
degree of proof required for a criminal conviction demonstrates the value
society places on this liberty interest.145 As early as 1798, this higher
standard was termed "beyond a reasonable doubt."
1 46
In Davis v. United States,147 the Supreme Court specifically recognized
freedom from bodily restraint as a fundamental liberty interest.148 The
Court reversed a murder conviction where the trial judge had instructed
the jury that a conviction was required "where the evidence [was] equally
balanced.' 49 The Court stated that the beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard is implicit in "constitutions [which] equally recognize the fundamen-
tal principles that are deemed essential for the protection of life and
liberty.'
150
2. The Stigma of a Criminal Conviction
A criminal conviction carries with it collateral effects independent of
incarceration. Upon release, a criminal is subject to civil disabilities.15'
Also, multiple convictions may brand the criminal a habitual offender,
which can result in a stiffer sentence and can later be used to impeach
credibility.'52 In addition, the stigma of the conviction is imposed on the
criminal's reputation. 53 The word "felon" is defined by Webster's Dic-
tionary as "villain."' 4 The word "criminal" is defined as "disgraceful." 155
In In re Winship,56 the Supreme Court designated as fundamental the
144. Shattuck, supra note 132, at 378 (quoting Care's English Liberties (1721)).
145. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. at
361 (stating that due to the potential for incarceration, criminal cases have traditionally
demanded a higher degree of proof).
146. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 361. Beyond a reasonable doubt was accepted at that
time as the "measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the trier [of
fact] of all the essential elements of guilt." Id;
147. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
148. Id. at 488.
149. Id. at 484.
150. Id. at 488.
151. Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. REv. 403 (1967). Civil Disabilities are
often "imposed as part of a regulatory statute setting qualifications to perform various
acts" such as voting, running for public office, jury service, and occupations ranging any-
where from engineers to barbers. Id. at 403 n.1, 404-05.
152. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784,790-91 (1969); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
54-56 (1968).
153. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
154. WEBSTER's NEW COLLEGiATE DICrIONARY 418 (1981).
155. I1& at 267.
156. 397 U.S. at 358.
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right to be free from the stigma associated with a criminal conviction.- 7
While considering procedures necessary to adjudge a juvenile as "delin-
quent," the Court noted that the accused in a criminal prosecution has
not only the loss of his freedom at stake but also the imposition of the
stigma associated with being labeled a criminal. 158 It stated that "a soci-
ety that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not
condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is reasonable
doubt about his guilt."15 9
In Ball v. United States, 60 the Supreme Court recognized that there are
limits beyond which stigma by conviction may not be imposed.' 6' Ball
had been convicted by a lower court on two counts, both arising from the
same action. 62 Regardless of the fact that his sentences were concurrent,
the Court held that both convictions could not stand.' 63 It recognized the
additional adverse consequences of a second conviction, including the im-
position of societal stigma associated with a criminal conviction. 64 The
second conviction, the Court determined, was an "impermissible
punishment.'
16
D. The Convicted Criminal and Subsequent Institutionalization for
Mental Illness
Prior to 1975, there were only two Supreme Court cases addressing
involuntary civil commitment and the rights of the mentally ill.166 These
cases were decided in 1872 and 1901 and dealt with the ability of an "in-
sane" person to execute a power of attorney and the sufficiency of notice
and opportunity to defend a petition of "lunacy," respectively.1 67 There
were, however, a string of landmark decisions in the 1960s and early
1970s addressing individuals charged with or convicted of a crime and
thereafter committed to a mental institution.
157. Id. at 359.
158. Id. at 363.
159. Id. at 363-64.
160. 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
161. Id. at 865.
162. Id. at 857-58.
163. Id. at 865.
164. Id. 'IWo convictions may affect the convicted criminal's eligibility for parole, result
in an increased sentence for a future offense and be used to impeach credibility. Id.
165. Id.
166. Grant H. Morris, The Supreme Court Examines Civil Commitment Issues: A Retro-
spective and Prospective Assessment, 60 TuL. L. REv. 927, 934 n.41 (1986).
167. Dexter v. Hall, 82 U.S. 9, 26 (1872); Simon v. Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1901).
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In the first of these cases, Baxstrom v. Herold,6 ' a unanimous Supreme
Court held that it was a violation of equal protection for Baxstrom, a
convicted criminal transferred to a mental hospital during his sentence, to
be held after the expiration of his sentence without the statutory civil
commitment procedures available to the noncriminal mentally ill.' 69 The
Court determined that once the state had made certain commitment pro-
cedures available to the noncriminal mentally ill, it could not, consistent
with equal protection, arbitrarily withhold it from the criminally in-
sane. 170 The state argued that the classification of "criminally insane,"
those with dangerous or criminal propensities, was a reasonable justifica-
tion for the disparate procedures.171 The Court found that commitment
procedures are only to determine whether the person is mentally ill and
in need of institutional care.' 72 Using a traditional rational-basis review,
the Court determined that the state's justification had no relevance with
regard to the purpose for the classification. 73 Although the Court did
not treat Baxstrom's liberty interest as fundamental and apply the strict
scrutiny standard, it was not necessary for the Court to do so in this case
because the issue could be dispensed with by using a lesser standard. 174
In 1972, the Court in Humphrey v. Cady'" dealt with a matter involv-
ing a convicted criminal who had been institutionalized rather than sen-
tenced to prison.' 76 At the end of the maximum sentence for his crime,
the state petitioned the court for a five year renewal order.17 7 As in Bax-
strom, the state had provided different procedures for involuntary civil
commitment. The state in Humphrey justified the denial of these proce-
dures to the criminally insane based on the fact that commitment was an
alternative to penal sentencing and the same procedural protections were
168. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
169. Id. at 110.
170. Id at 111.
171. I
172. Id
173. I The distinction between mentally ill and dangerously or criminally insane
would be relevant for postcommitment treatment. Id
174. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985) (stating one of the
"two ... cardinal rules governing the federal courts" is to "never formulate a rule of consti-
tutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied").
175. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
176. Id at 506. Humphrey had been convicted of "contributing to the delinquency of a
minor" and, in lieu of his one year maximum sentence, he was committed to the "'sex
deviate facility"' in state prison. Id (quoting Wis. STAT. ANN. §947.15 (1958), as amended,
c. 975 (1971)).
177. See id at 507.
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therefore not required.'78 The Court reiterated its holding in Baxstrom
that, having made certain procedures available to those subjected to in-
voluntary civil commitment, those same procedures could not be arbitrar-
ily withheld from criminals facing involuntary commitment without
violating equal protection.179 Again, using the traditional rational-basis
review, a unanimous Court found that the state's justifications, while rele-
vant to the initial commitment, carried little weight with regard to re-
newal orders. As in Baxstrom, the Court did not treat the liberty interest
as fundamental because it was not necessary to dispense with the issue.
However, the Court did recognize that commitment to a mental institu-
tion is a "massive curtailment of liberty."' 80
That same year, the Supreme Court, in Jackson v. Indiana, a' extended
the Baxstrom holding to invalidate a statute that permitted a lifetime
commitment of a charged criminal found incompetent to stand trial, find-
ing it to be a violation of equal protection.'" Jackson, a "mentally defec-
tive deaf mute with a mental level of a pre-school child,"183 had been
charged with robbery and was then found incompetent to stand trial.'81
The trial court committed him to a mental institution "until such time as
[the Indiana Department of Mental Health] should certify to the court
that 'the defendant is sane."'185 The Supreme Court unanimously deter-
mined that if a criminal conviction (as in Baxstrom and Humphrey) was
insufficient to justify procedures less than those for civil commitment,
"the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice.
a18 6
In Vitek v. Jones,187 the Court recognized the stigma associated with
commitment to a mental institution as separate and apart from that im-
posed by a criminal conviction.188 The action was a procedural due pro-
cess challenge to a state statute which allowed a prisoner to be
178. Id. at 510.
179. See id. at 508,511. Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case. Id. at 517.
180. Id at 509.
181. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
182. Id. at 730.
183. Id at 717.
184. Id at 717-19. It should be noted that Jackson was charged with two separate rob-
beries. The first was the theft of a purse and its belongings with a total value of four dollars
and the second was the theft of five dollars in cash. Id at 717.
185. Id at 719.
186. Id at 724. Again, the Court did not use any form of heightened scrutiny as it was
not necessary to dispense with the issue. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
187. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
188. Id at 492.
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transferred to a mental institution on the determination of a physician or
psychologist that he was mentally ill and could not be given proper treat-
ment in prison.18 9 The Court held that the involuntary transfer of a con-
victed criminal to a mental institution implicates a liberty interest
protected by the due process clause. 190 It recognized that a valid criminal
conviction and sentence extinguishes a defendant's right to freedom from
confinement, but that involuntary commitment to a mental institution is
not within the range of conditions of confinement imposed by a criminal
sentence.191 The criminal convict retains a "residuum of liberty" that
may not be infringed without proper procedures, including notice and
hearing." 2 The Court determined that this liberty interest is more than a
loss of freedom from bodily restraint, but also a loss of freedom from the
stigma associated with commitment to a mental institution. 93 It recog-
nized that this stigma can have a "'very significant impact on the
individual."' 94
In 1990, the Supreme Court, in Foucha v. Louisiana,195 stated that free-
dom from bodily restraint is a fundamental right. 96 Foucha involved a
substantive due process and equal protection challenge to a state statute
requiring an insanity acquitee to be held in a mental hospital if he is
found to be dangerous, even if he is no longer mentally ill.1' The Court
determined that where a statute infringes upon the fundamental right to
be free from bodily restraint, the state's interest must be "particularly
convincing."198 The state did not meet this burden and the Court held
that once the acquitee is no longer mentally ill it violates his fundamental
liberty interest to be held as such.' 9 9 The Court also reaffirmed its con-
clusion in Vitek that the liberty interest lost when one is involuntarily
committed to a mental institution, even if already a convicted criminal, is
189. Id. at 482-83.
190. Id. at 491.
191. Id, at 493.
192. Id. at 491, 495-96.
193. Id at 492.
194. Id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,425-26 (1979)). The Court again did
not use any form of heightened scrutiny as it was not necessary to dispense with the issue.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
195. 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992).
196. Id. at 1788.
197. Id. at 1782.
198. Id. at 1788.
199. Id at 1788-89. In addition, the Court noted that the purpose of imprisonment is
deterrence and retribution. Id. at 1788. Foucha had been acquitted by reason of insanity
and so he could not be punished. Id. at 1785.
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not only a loss of freedom from bodily restraint but also a loss of freedom
from the stigma imposed by the commitment.2°°
E. Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill
O'Connor v. Donaldson 0 1 decided in 1975, marked the first time since
1901 that the Supreme Court had considered the rights of a mentally ill
person in a purely civil context.2 "2 Donaldson had been involuntarily
committed to a mental institution where he was kept against his will for
fifteen years.20 3 He was not considered dangerous, but the hospital did
not feel he could make a "successful adjustment" outside the institu-
tion."' Donaldson brought his action claiming the hospital and its super-
intendent had intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his
constitutional right to liberty.205 The Court did not delve into the "diffi-
cult issues of constitutional law" but simply held that a finding of mental
illness alone cannot constitutionally justify depriving Donaldson of his
physical liberty.2"6
In Addington v. Texas,207 a unanimous Supreme Court set the mini-
mum standard of proof required by due process for an involuntary civil
commitment.20 8 It stated that in cases involving individual liberty inter-
ests the standard of proof reflects the value society places on those inter-
ests.209 The Court, citing Humphrey v. Cady and Jackson v. Indiana,
reiterated its view that civil commitment for any reason is a "significant
deprivation of liberty,"210 and recognized that it is "indisputable" that
commitment can "engender adverse social consequences [i.e., stigma]."2 1'
While the Addington Court conceded that the state had legitimate in-
terests as part of its parens patriae and police powers to provide care for
the mentally ill and to protect the community from those who are danger-
ous,212 it found that the individual interest in the outcome of the proceed-
ing is "of such weight and gravity" that a standard of "preponderance of
200. Id. at 1784-85.
201. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
202. Morris, supra note 166, at 934 nA0.
203. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 564.
204. Id. at 568. Dr. O'Connor could not remember the basis for this conclusion. Id.
205. Id. at 565.
206. Id. at 576.
207. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
208. Id. at 433.
209. Id. at 425.
210. Id
211. Id. at 426.
212. Id.
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the evidence" is not sufficient.213 The Court considered the imposition of
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 14 However, the Court settled
on applying a standard of clear and convincing evidence due in part to the
fact that the "subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis" are such
that a beyond a reasonable doubt standard might make commitment im-
possible altogether.215
V. HELLER V. DOE UNDER A STRICr SCRUTINY, FUNDAMENTAL
INTEREST ANALYSIS
For the mentally retarded, like the mentally ill and the criminal, free-
dom from bodily restraint and from the stigma imposed by such restraint
is among the most fundamental of liberty interests. Freedom from bodily
restraint is at the "core of... liberty [interests] ' 216 and can be traced
through the English roots of our jurisprudence as far back as the Magna
Carta.217 Today, commitment for any purpose is considered a "significant
deprivation of liberty"218 and the Supreme Court is careful not to "mini-
mize the importance and fundamental nature of [the individual's] right
[to liberty]. '219 This liberty interest includes "an almost infinite range of
life's freedoms, seemingly mundane and trivial in isolation but invaluable
in the aggregate., 221 Such freedoms include walking "in the woods on a
weekend afternoon or calling a friend.""' There is no reason to believe
that the mentally retarded think less of their freedom.2 2 It would be
213. Id. at 427.
214. Id. at 428.
215. Id. at 430, 432. The beyond a reasonable doubt standard works in a criminal trial
because "specific, knowable facts" are being addressed, whereas a psychiatric diagnosis is
"based on medical 'impressions' drawn from subjective analysis and filtered through the
experience of the diagnostician." Id.
216. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982).
217. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
218. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425.
219. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).
220. Br. of Am. Ass'n on Mental Retardation, supra note 11, at 9 n.7.
221. Id
222. Id. at 10. The impact of institutionalization on a mentally retarded person is "real,
tangible, and is felt by that person in a number of varied ways." Amicus Curiae Brief of
Focus on Community Understanding and Services, Inc. (FOCUS); People First of Ne-
braska; People First of Ruston, Louisiana; People First of Tennessee; and People First of
Washington in Support of Respondents at 20, Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) (No. 92-
351). One mentally retarded person forced to live in an institution for 48 years stated:
No one should have to live in an institution. It's not home. Their home is right
out here with everyone else.
I went to Rainer School when I was a small boy because my mom and dad
couldn't take care of me. I did carpentry there. I missed a lot.
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"constitutionally and philosophically unacceptable" to place a lesser
value on their freedom because they are mentally retarded.22
Institutionalization not only results in a loss of physical freedom, but it
carries with it associated stigma.2 4 In relation to the mentally retarded,
stigma can be defined as the "difference between how one actually is (
e.g., retarded) and how one is expected to be (i.e., competent, independ-
ent)."2' The label of "mental retardation" is stigmatizing in and of it-
self.226 It is common for the mentally retarded to be obsessed with
passing as normal or nonretarded.227 The mentally retarded often have
negative reactions to or low opinions of other retarded persons and try to
associate with "nonretarded" persons in an effort to appear "normal.""2
Institutionalization is even more stigmatizing for the mentally retarded.
One study revealed that the mentally retarded try to conceal the reasons
for their institutionalization with stories of mental illness, nerves, alcohol-
ism, or even criminal offenses.2 9
Kentucky has a legitimate objective "'under its parens patriae powers
in providing care to its citizens who are unable ... to care for themselves,'
as well as 'authority under its police power to protect the community'
from dangerous persons. 3 Institutionalization, however, affects an indi-
vidual's fundamental right to be free from bodily restraint and associated
Now, I can take the bus by myself and I like that. Nobody comes with me.
When I was at the institution, no one would let me do anything by myself. I don't
feel so good that my friends are still there. I visit them and they visit me. They
don't belong there.
Id.
223. Br. of Am. Ass'n on Mental Retardation, supra note 11, at 11.
224. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979).
225. S.E. Szivos & E. Griffiths, Group Processes Involved In Coming To Terms With A
Mentally Retarded Identity, 28 MENTAL RETARDATION 333, 333 (1990) (citation omitted).
226. Steven Reiss, Ph.D. & Betsey A. Benson, Ph.D., Awareness of Negative Social
Conditions Among Mentally Retarded, Emotionally Disturbed Outpatients, 141 AM. J. Psy-
cHtATRY 88, 88 (1984). "There are few labels more devastating psychologically than that of
mental retardation." Id. Many mentally retarded people are aware of the "negative social
reality" and this may impede their psychological development. Id.
227. Frederick X. Gibbons, Stigma Perception: Social Comparison Among Mentally Re-
tarded Persons, 90 AM. J. MErrNAL DEFICIENCY 98, 99 (1985).
228. Id. at 98; see also Cindy Loose, Changes Pose Downer For Hill Picker-Upper: 12-
Year Elevator Operator Fears GOP Job Cuts, WASH. PosT, Dec. 11, 1994, at B1 (An eleva-
tor operator who lives in a "group house for those who need help living independently of
their families" raves about her job. She says "'I love this job. I love it .... I [get to] meet
friendly people. I meet congressmen. I get the opportunity to be with normal people.').
229. ROBERT B. EDGERTON, Trm CLOAK OF COMPETENCE 134 (1993).
230. Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637,2649 (1993) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 426 (1979)).
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stigma. Therefore, it is a violation of equal protection for Kentucky to
provide disparate involuntary civil commitment procedures for the men-
tally ill and the mentally retarded, unless its objective is compelling and
the disparate procedures are necessary. 31 To be compelling, Kentucky's
interest in exercising its parens patriae and police powers must be so great
that it justifies limiting the right of the mentally retarded to be free from
bodily restraint and associated stigma. 2 To be necessary, the differential
procedures must be the only way the State can address its objective.233
The facial defect in Kentucky's case is its assignment of a higher bur-
den of proof for commitment of the mentally ill, compared to that re-
quired to commit the mentally retarded. Burdens of proof reflect not
only the difficulty of avoiding error but also reflect the importance or
value society places on the liberty interest at stake.23" The Supreme
Court, in Addington, held that a preponderance of the evidence standard
in a civil commitment proceeding for the mentally ill is not sufficient due
to the weight and gravity of the interest at stake. 35 The Court found it so
important to avoid an erroneous commitment that it considered the much
higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. 36 However, due in part
to the "subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis that render cer-
tainties virtually beyond reach in most instances," the Court settled on
the standard of clear and convincing evidence as the minimum standard
of proof for involuntary civil commitment procedures.23
7
Kentucky has determined that the fundamental interest of the mentally
ill to be free from bodily restraint and the stigma imposed by such re-
straint is "so precious" that, despite the difficulty in diagnosing mental
illness, it has set the burden of proof for involuntary commitment at be-
yond a reasonable doubt.238 Equal protection and the Baxstrom holding
dictate that Kentucky may not provide the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard for commitment of the mentally ill and then arbitrarily withhold
the standard from the mentally retarded.239 The State justifies the lower
231. 3 ROTUNDA & NowAx, supra note 5, at 15; see also supra notes 58-62 and accom-
panying text (discussing the strict scrutiny standard of review).
232. I
233. Id.
234. Addington, 441 U.S. at 418.
235. Id at 427.
236. Id at 422-30.
237. Id at 430.
238. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2652.
239. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107,111 (1966); see also, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
717, 724 (1980) (affirming the Baxstrom holding); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 508
(1972) (affirming the Baxstrom holding).
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burden of proof for involuntary commitment of the mentally retarded on
the grounds that it is easier to diagnose mental retardation and that the
determination of the dangerousness of a mentally retarded person may
be made with more accuracy.24 These justifications have no relevance to
the State's objective.241 The mentally retarded and the mentally ill, as
candidates for involuntary civil commitment, may both need to be cared
for and may both be dangerous. The State's objective in caring for the
subject individual and protecting the community is of "equal strength in
each category of cases."'242 As the State's objective in institutionalizing
the mentally ill and mentally retarded is the same, it clearly cannot be
compelling. The disparate procedures are, therefore, a violation of equal
protection.
Regardless of whether the State's objective is compelling, the disparate
burdens of proof still violate equal protection because the lower standard
of proof is not necessary to promote the State's objective. If, as Kentucky
proposes, mental retardation is easier to diagnose than mental illness, it
will have less difficulty meeting a beyond a reasonable doubt standard in
cases involving the mentally retarded than it does in cases involving the
mentally ill.
As Kentucky's objective does not support disparate burdens of proof
for the mentally retarded and the mentally ill, the State's objective does
not support allowing the guardian or family of the mentally retarded to
participate in the proceedings, as if a party. Again, the State's objective is
to care for individuals who cannot care for themselves and to protect the
community from those that are dangerous. The importance of this objec-
tive does not vary depending on whether the subject individual is men-
tally ill or mentally retarded. The State's objective is of "equal strength
in each category of cases,"'243 and therefore, cannot be compelling.
Kentucky's statutory provision permitting participation of guardian
and family, as if a party, is also unnecessary to promote the State's objec-
tive. Kentucky justifies the provision on the basis that the guardian or
family member will have "intimate knowledge" of the mentally retarded
person and will be able to provide "valuable insights" that the families of
240. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643-44.
241. Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 111 (stating that where the purpose of classification is to
determine whether institutional care is needed, distinctions between the two classes of
committment is irrelevant).
242. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2653.
243. Id.
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the mentally ill would not.2" The State's objective, however, can be
achieved by parental participation on the interdisciplinary teams (which
is already a part of the commitment process) 245 and the participation of
guardians or family members as witnesses in the proceeding.4 6
In addition to being unnecessary, the interests of the guardian or family
member are not always the same as those of the mentally retarded per-
son. There are four recognized factors influencing a move toward institu-
tionalization: characteristics of the disabled individual, characteristics of
the family, outside influences on individuals and their families,247 and pa-
rental perception? 48 In mentally retarded adults, "[s]tressors within the
family, the burden of care, and disruption of family relations contribute[ ]
significantly [to the decision-making process]." 249 Community attitudes
also have been recognized as influencing the decision for institutionaliza-
tion. 50 If the view of the community in which the mentally retarded per-
son lives "reflects a fear of 'deviant' human beings, the parents [or
guardians] will probably be under considerable social pressure-subtle or
otherwise-to" institutionalize. 21 As Justice Souter recognized, where
the guardian or parent desires institutionalization, participation as if a
244. Id at 2647.
245. Br. of Am. Ass'n on Mental Retardation, supra note 11, at 19. The interdiscipli-
nary team "makes service recommendations for the mentally retarded person facing invol-
untary commitment." Id The Kentucky code states:
The interdisciplinary team shall: 1. Conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the
individual, not more than three (3) months before admission, covering physical,
emotional, social, and cognitive factors; and 2. Prior to admission define the need
for service without regard to availability of those services. The team shall review
all available and applicable programs of care, treatment, and training and record
its findings ....
Ky. RFv. STAT. ANN. § 202B.045(1)(b) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
246. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2656-57.
247. Tausig, supra note 125, at 352 (discussing the often divergent interests of mentally
retarded persons and their parents); see also BEmNF_-SMrrH ET AL, supra note 12, at 501-
03. Characteristics of the disabled individual that can lead to institutionalization include
"medical needs, nonmedical needs, need for protection, and behavioral problems." Id at
501. Characteristics of the family are analyzed in the form of family involvement which
includes "[d]aily stressors, number of parents in the home, years of parental education,
level of income and proximity to the out-of-home... facility." Id. at 501-02. Outside influ-
ences or nonfamily factors include the advice of physicians, clergy, other professionals, and
even attitudes of the community. Id. at 502.
248. BEnuu,-SMrri ET AL., supra note 12, at 502. This is often erroneous as to "specific
characteristics of their children in conjunction with the belief that the institutional setting is
the best alternative possible." Id
249. Tausig, supra note 125, at 358.
250. BzmN-SmrrH ET AL., supra note 12, at 502.
251. Id at 502-03.
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party places both a second advocate for institutionalization and a second
prosecutor on the mentally retarded 52 There is no justification for this
imposition on the fundamental interest of the mentally retarded where it
is not imposed on the same fundamental interest of the mentally ill.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Heller majority denied Doe's request for a heightened scrutiny re-
view because it was not raised in the lower courts, and therefore was not
properly presented.253 Others seeking to challenge the disparate commit-
ment procedures of the forty-one states with disparate laws are not likely
to make the same mistake.
Mental illness and mental retardation are by no means alike. However,
mere identification of differences is not sufficient under a Fourteenth
Amendment analysis of involuntary civil commitment procedures, where
a fundamental interest such as freedom from bodily restraint and associ-
ated stigma is at stake. Equal protection requires the distinctions be-
tween the proceedings to be supported by a compelling state objective
and to be necessary.254 The differences between the mentally retarded
and the mentally ill may be relevant for the promotion of other state
objectives. Prior to commitment, however, the mentally ill and mentally
retarded are just two classes of individuals facing the loss of their funda-
mental right to be free from bodily restraint and associated stigma by
involuntary commitment to a state institution. The State's objective to
care for these people and to protect the community is of "equal strength
in each category of cases."" 5 In view of this equality, it is a violation of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution to treat the mentally retarded differently than the
mentally ill in involuntary civil commitment proceedings.
Laura R. Biddle
252. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2657.
253. Id at 2642.
254. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 109, 111 (1966).
255. Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2653.
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